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Author’s Response:  Cognitive Science,  History-
Centrism and the Future of Hindu Studies 
Rajiv Malhotra 
Infinity Foundation 
I thank all three responders to my books for 
their careful and detailed consideration of my 
work. I will address the following concerns that 
they raise:  
• their challenge to my claim that the 
dharmic traditions are more in tune with 
modern cognitive science than the 
Abrahamic ones are 
• their challenge to my claim that history-
centrism in the Abrahamic faiths is an 
important point of difference  
• their claim that I ignore how historical 
forces influence dharma 
• their claim against a coherent Hindu 
philosophy and unity 
• Brian Pennington’s tension with the reality 
that the academy seeks to engage me. 
 
I .  Response to Rambachan 
 Anantanand Rambachan has given the 
most thorough and substantive response to my 
work, and I thank him for it. We disagree 
primarily on two points: the question of the 
relationship of science to adhyatma vidya, or 
the inner meditative practices taught by 
dharmic traditions, and the issue of the 
coherence and integral unity of Hinduism. 
Rambachan regards the association of 
Hinduism with science as spurious and 
misleading, a product of the distorting 
influence of the West on such Hindu figures as 
Vivekananda and Aurobindo. He also regards 
any claim to a Hindu unity as largely a 
construct of colonialism. In both cases, he 
thinks my views discount the role of the 
exegetical tradition of Vedanta as insisted upon 
by Shankara vis-à-vis direct inner experience. 
In fact, I have asserted that the modern Hindu 
thinkers have revitalized and expanded their 
tradition in a way that is entirely in line with 
the past, that dharma has never been in tension 
with science, and that in fact dharma and 
today’s cognitive science come close to 
converging. I also hold that Hindu dharma has 
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a valuable and coherent past, present and 
future with highly developed adhyatmic 
practices and experiences. 
I agree with Rambachan’s desire to protect 
Advaita Vedanta’s non-dualism and I share his 
position on the utter unknowability of the 
divine by means of ordinary consciousness, 
owing to the subject/object split. I also share 
his interest in preserving the diversity of the 
Hindu dharma vis-à-vis those who would 
reduce it to homogeneity. However, I part 
company when he argues for reliance solely on 
third-person textual authority for knowing 
Brahman. As I shall explain, he is working from 
some wrong assumptions about the nature of 
science, the Vedanta-yoga relationship, and the 
internal coherence and innate pluralism of the 
dharma traditions.  
It should be noted that Rambachan and I 
come from different intellectual backgrounds 
and therefore adopt different approaches to 
the matter at hand. I speak from a background 
in science as well as personal sadhana in 
several dharmic approaches, based on which I 
have extensively researched the Western 
appropriation of Indian thought in psychology, 
cognitive sciences, cosmology, philosophy and 
religion. Rambachan takes what I believe to be 
a more bookish and narrow approach that is 
exclusively focused on Advaita Vedanta and 
steeped in hermeneutical and exegetical 
problems that arise from the use of the Judeo-
Christian paradigm for religious studies. My 
most important conversations and debates 
have been in the philosophy of science and the 
history of the transmission of ideas from India 
to the West. His have been largely in academic 
religious studies. 
The result is an ironic “disconnect.” Not 
only is Rambachan unaware of how closely 
contemporary scientific thought accords with a 
wide range of dharmic views and practices; he 
fails to see that this area of thought itself draws 
directly and extensively on Indian sources. A 
large part of my work has to do with tracking 
and repositioning certain Indian sources that 
are at the heart of the confluence of science 
and spirituality, which is the cutting edge of 
Western thought. By contrast, Rambachan 
refutes the validity of these ideas in Hindu 
dharma. So the West appropriates what 
Rambachan considers inauthentic. This 
disconnect gets my attention. 
Furthermore, his assertion that Hinduism 
lacks coherence is mistaken, as well as 
debilitating insofar as it deprives Hinduism of 
its potential for providing an open architecture 
of faiths that could serve as the basis for a truly 
pluralist framework for humanity. 
Rambachan’s sweeping rejection of modern 
Hinduism (which he pejoratively calls “neo-
Hinduism”) cuts this project off at the knees. 
His emphasis on the primacy of the exegetical 
tradition of Advaita Vedanta, while in many 
ways a valuable corrective to the “anything 
goes” kind of Hindu thinking that tends to 
prevail, is both extreme and limiting. 
Rambachan could make a great 
contribution to Hindu Studies if he could only 
recognize the new paradigms emerging in 
science and religion and accept a broader 
definition of what Hinduism is and how it 
relates to contemporary Western thought. 
Were he to open his eyes to the Western 
appropriation of Hindu ideas, he might (given 
his expertise) be able to shed some much-
needed light on the matter in terms of 
clarification and correction.  
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‘New’  paradigms imported  from India  into  
the  West  
My book Being Different claims that the 
inner sciences of the dharmic traditions are 
closer to the spirit and substance of 
contemporary scientific inquiry than are the 
beliefs and practices of the Abrahamic 
religions. Rambachan’s resistance to this claim 
is the basis of much of his critique of my work 
(and of modern Hinduism in general). In my 
view, his phobic response to the association of 
science and religion is based on an outdated 
paradigm of science. What’s more, it reflects a 
narrow reading of the dharmic traditions. He 
underestimates, for example, the significance 
of direct inner inquiry and first-person 
experience in Shankara’s teachings and in 
Hinduism and Buddhism in general.  
Rambachan insists on denying the 
connection between dharmic meditative 
practices and the methods and metaphysical 
assumptions of cognitive science as they are 
practiced today. He ignores both the empirical 
nature of the rishis’ experience and the new 
scientific paradigms that are emerging. I wish 
to stress that Hindus have had no cause to be 
afraid of science in the way the Abrahamic 
traditions have had cause, and that is because 
the metaphysical and theological assumptions 
of dharma are not dependent on the defense of 
dogmatic historical revelations. Furthermore, 
contemporary physics and cognitive science 
challenge precisely the dualistic model of 
subject/object split – and they challenge it in 
terms actually appropriated from the study of 
Hinduism and Buddhism. It is first-person 
experience and experiment that bind dharma 
and cognitive science together. Once this new 
paradigm of cognitive science became 
crystallized with the help of Hindu and 
Buddhist sources, it became generalized into a 
broader discourse on “science and religion,” 
one which permeates the academy today 
(except ironically in the study of Indian 
religions). 
In simple terms, this scientific paradigm 
developed from the recognition of the role of 
the observer in cognition. Newtonian physics 
assumed an objective reality independent of 
consciousness. This is now considered 
reductionist. The recent scientific shift is 
toward a metaphysics that is closer to the 
cosmology of the Upanishads than to Christian 
theological constructs (based, as they usually 
are, on classical Greek models). This new 
insight involves cultivating the ability to 
experience reality in radically new ways. The 
new scientists of cognition know Hinduism to 
be closely related to their field, and adhyatma 
vidya is positioned as an important means of 
scientific inquiry. Rambachan’s refusal to 
engage with my work is therefore indicative of 
a broader dis-connect between academic 
Hinduism studies and the emerging cognitive 
science. 
Rambachan would probably agree with me 
that this interrelation between science and 
dharma should not be studied (as it often has 
been) by shearing off the cultural, religious and 
philosophical context in which it was born. 
This attempt to “sanitize” what is trivialized as 
“eastern wisdom” and repackage it in western 
secular scientific terms has been going on for 
too long. A large part of my current work is 
aimed at documenting and understanding this 
process of “digestion” and deracination. 
The pattern is a recurring one: an 
intellectual entrepreneur “goes east” in much 
the same way that American frontiersmen 
“went west.” He may feel that the Abrahamic 
3
Malhotra: Author’s Response
Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2013
Author’s Response:  Cognitive Science, History-Centrism and the Future of Hindu Studies 31 
 
religions are too restrictive or oppressive, 
and/or that they are intellectually bankrupt in 
the face of new evidence in physics, psychology 
and healing sciences. New treasures are 
unearthed during this process of eastern 
exploration, and these are especially prized 
when they can be made to operate outside of 
accepted western categories, including the 
category of religion itself. At first, the Indian 
aspects of these new bodies of knowledge are 
noted and relished as the basis on which the 
entrepreneur/frontiersman can establish 
himself as an expert before his western peers. 
But as that knowledge gets repackaged for 
consumption in the West, the original contexts 
are removed and left behind as “exotica.” 
The repackaged knowledge and new 
disciplines supersede the old Western religious 
paradigms. Removing the original Indian 
contexts leads to forms of perennial philosophy 
or secular scientism which are supposedly 
value-free and operate outside of religious 
myths and devotional practices. In my view, 
this is a mistake, and if Rambachan believes 
Vedanta is in need of being protected from this 
deracination and de-contextualization, then I 
entirely agree with him. But it would also be a 
great mistake to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater, i.e., to deny all relationships 
between dharmic traditions and the new 
science. 
The chart below shows the “digestion” 
process by which dharma gets assimilated into 
modern cognitive science. It shows the Indian 
sources of the new scientific paradigm and lists 
some of the channels by which those sources 
have entered Western consciousness, as well as 
some ways in which they have constituted and 
shaped new areas of study (even new 
departments in the academy). These sources 
have, in effect, redrawn the boundaries of what 
is considered science today. 
The box on the top left lists some of the 
main dharmic sources that have been mined, 
and that continue to be mined in this 
enterprise. These Indian source traditions 
include: Buddhism (especially Zen and Indo-
Tibetan), Kashmir Shaivism, Patanjali’s yoga, 
Tantra, Vedanta (especially Advaita and 
Vishitadvaita), Vipassana, and the work of Sri 
Aurobindo. This is far from an exhaustive list, 
and one could easily add other influences such 
as J. Krishnamurti, Ramana Maharshi, 
Vivekananda and Paramahansa Yogananda, to 
name just a few. 
The box at the top right lists a few of the 
many Western organizations involved in this 
large-scale project. The Western disciplines 
digesting this knowledge encompass 
philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, religion, 
medicine, and so on. I have been studying 
several of these groups for a forthcoming series 
of books which will explore how Western 
organizations go about identifying, selecting, 
validating and repackaging the dharmic 
knowledge, and then claim the status of 
“original discoverers” by gradually erasing the 
source traditions. (In Being Different, I explain 
how lack of acknowledgment in this 
appropriation differs from the appropriations 
that were made from Hellenistic sources, and 
why Western scholars do not treat Indian and 
Hellenistic sources on par.) 
The Western players cited in the top right 
box have criticized the old-school approach 
taken by Western religions, science, psychology 
and philosophy. They find these disciplines to 
be reductionist and in need of radical reform. 
They often criticize Western thought by 
turning directly and primarily to Indian 
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sources, and they do so to a degree that is not 
sufficiently recognized. The two lower boxes 
indicate that this “churning” process in the 
West is crystalizing into well-defined and well-
respected fields that are rapidly becoming 
accepted into the mainstream academy. This 
appropriation from India and tension or 
conflict in the West between old and new 
models started a century ago, but the 
challenges to older paradigms have recently 
intensified, prompting a dramatic rethinking in 
mainstream circles. The very notions of science 
and religion are changing. 
Indian gurus both in India and in the West 
trained individual American “frontiersmen,” 
who then turned the knowledge gained at the 
feet of those teachers into what was at first a 
fringe movement. Over the past two 
generations, these proto-movements have 
solidified and advanced from the fringe to the 
mainstream of Western research, all the while 
losing sight of, or repressing, their Indian roots. 
The list of mainstream institutions and major 
intellectual figures participating in this process 
is indeed impressive. There has often been a 
double role played by the various 
intermediaries, individuals as well as 
institutions. 
• These intermediaries appropriate from 
dharma what is (or until recently was) 
novel in the West, and often express harsh 
criticism of the prevailing Western 
religious models. This helps them get 
established as pioneers and original 
thinkers for Western audiences. 
• Once the Indian sources have been used to 
gather knowledge and create credibility for 
themselves, the intermediaries dilute the 
significance of those sources (this often 
involves elaborate cover-ups) and 
sometimes even attack the dharmic sources 
as being inferior. 
The framework for this “digestion,” as I call 
it, is partly secular science and partly Judeo-
Christianity. While many appropriations have 
entered directly into Christianity (such as 
Christian Centering Prayer from T.M., Christian 
Yoga from Hindu Yoga, to name only two), 
others have arrived via a longer route. This 
latter category includes holistic healing, 
neurosciences, and cognitive sciences. 
As I have said, much of my disagreement 
with Rambachan centers around (1) his lack of 
awareness of what science is today and (2) the 
absorption of Indian thought into this new 
science. My approach is different. When I use 
the term “adhyatma vidya,” for instance, I’m 
relating it to the modes of empirical inquiry as 
currently understood in cognitive science. This 
method involves first-person experience 
combined with third-person analysis of mind. 
Rambachan works from a different model of 
what science is and he finds it to be antithetical 
to Advaita Vedanta. We also differ on the 
importance of text and transmission in 
dharmic traditions vis-à-vis the West, an issue 
to which I will return. 
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New Science  of  Consciousness  without  
dual ism/object i f icat ion  
 Rambachan cites Shankara as the great 
counter-example to my emphasis on adhyatma 
vidya. He makes the valid point that Shankara 
considers the Vedas to be the only way of 
knowing Brahman. Along with this, Rambachan 
argues that science deals only with dualistic 
objects, i.e., it objectifies whatever object is 
being studied as something that exists 
Re-contextualization of Appropriations: 
• Emerging New School of Religious Studies 
• Cognitive Science and Religion 
• Integral Theory of Wilber 
• Rejecting Western hermeneutics, philosophy, 
psychology 
Main sources of appropriation:  
• Vedanta 
• Zen Buddhism 
• Indo-Tibetan Buddhism  
• Kashmir Shaivism 
• Patanjali Yoga 
• Transcendental Meditation 
• Tantra,  Kundalini, Chakras 
• Vipassana  
• Sri Aurobindo 
Some leading individual & 
institutional appropriators  
• Ken Wilber’s Integral Institute 
• John Templeton Foundation 
• Mind & Life Institute 
• Consciousness Studies  Programs  
• Mindfulness Meditation 
• Center for Compassion & Altruism 
Research & Education 
• Neuro-phenomenology 
 
Re-­‐training	  
Jewish	  &	  
Christian	  Clergy	  
Scientific	  
Validation	  as	  
new	  ‘Discovery’	  
Attacking	  Old	  
Disciplines	  
  
Figure 1 
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independently of the subject. It is true that this 
dualistic method cannot lead one to knowledge 
of Brahman, but Rambachan shows an 
awareness only of old-school science when he 
makes this point. 
Quantum mechanics has radically changed 
science in this regard. According to QM (as per 
many interpretations), consciousness plays a 
role as the observer in “creating” (by collapsing 
into) the state of the object that is observed. In 
other words, there is no particular state that 
the object is in until it is observed. Prior to an 
object’s being observed, what we have are 
probabilities for its existence in various 
possible states. In a sense, the very act of 
observation “creates” the state of the object in 
which it is found. 
The link between this new physics and 
dharma has been noted since the discovery of 
QM by Heisenberg and Schrodinger (both Nobel 
Laureates in physics). Each of these pioneers 
cited the Upanishads as the only source of 
philosophy known to them that was consistent 
with the paradoxical nature of reality 
according to QM.1 Western philosophical 
frameworks at that time (the 1920s and early 
'30s) failed to accommodate any such 
possibility as QM. This ushered in a new era of 
speculative research into the nature of 
consciousness and its relationship with the 
physical cosmos. 
Most of the early philosophical 
explanations of QM explicitly invoked ideas 
from Vedanta. There was a frenzied attempt to 
replace the separate Western frameworks for 
consciousness and matter with a unified 
framework based on Vedanta. (In most dharma, 
metaphysical systems, consciousness, and 
matter were never separate frameworks.) The 
research literature on such ideas in the West 
has mushroomed and now spans many fields, 
including the philosophy of science, 
psychology, arts, neuroscience, religion, 
healing, etc. I shall not attempt here to present 
a tutorial on this vast terrain. Suffice it to say 
that the term “first-person empiricism” is now 
widely accepted as the means to knowing 
consciousness directly by experiencing non-
dual states. Although initially marginalized 
upon its arrival in the West, this new paradigm 
has become respectable and is seriously 
challenging old reductionist views of science.  
What is most relevant to our discussion is 
that the pioneers in this science of 
consciousness start off by attacking the 
classical Western (Newtonian and Cartesian) 
models as being reductionist, and precisely for 
the reasons cited by Rambachan: the models 
are dualistic in their separation of subject and 
object, and assume wrongly that objects have a 
separate self-existence. Rambachan, then, 
cannot very well accuse the new science of 
consciousness of the very problem it seeks to 
resolve, i.e., the reductionism intrinsic in 
“objectification” as practiced in scientific 
enquiry. 
 
Are we a l l  potentia l  r ishis?  
I call adhyatma vidya “inner science” for a 
reason, which is to emphasize that after the 
rishis meditated and articulated in the 
Upanishads what they “saw,” these first-person 
experiences were systematized and debated in 
peer reviews in India. This tradition of purva 
paksha and uttara paksha is how major Indian 
systems were established, i.e., through a 
combination of empirical observation, 
argumentation, and peer review which strongly 
resembles the scientific method. This process 
has never been in tension with the scientific 
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method because it is not bound to absolutist 
claims of history that are non-reproducible and 
hence non-verifiable. It is this conjunction that 
Vivekananda and other modern Hinduism 
intuited and that is being developed today. 
Rambachan has not addressed the key 
question: How did the rishis “see” the shruti in the 
first place? Unlike the Abrahamic religions, in 
which prophets hear from an external God, in 
the Vedas there is no external voice. There is 
no entity equivalent to Yahweh who speaks the 
Vedas to the rishis. Nobody says anything like: 
“I am Brahma, the Creator, and I am giving you 
these covenants . . .” So Rambachan must 
explain how the Vedas were “seen” by the 
rishis.  
He cannot respond by saying that the 
Vedas were original compositions by the rishis, 
because Vedas are a-purusheya, i.e., 
beginningless and authorless. They existed 
before the rishis “saw” them. So if the rishis 
neither composed them nor heard them spoken 
by an external person or entity, how is it that 
they were able to “see” them? To the best of my 
knowledge, Rambachan, in his four decades of 
re-stating his position on the dichotomy 
between Vedanta and direct experience, has 
never dealt with this key question. What I am 
doing here, in effect, is sending the problem 
back to him and asking him for a solution in his 
own framework. 
It is important to note that Hinduism does 
not regard the rishis as inherently different in 
substance or essence from the rest of us. 
Therefore, if the rishis had the capability of 
“seeing” the shruti without any external God 
speaking to them, and without any previous 
textual tradition or “revelation” to draw on, 
why can’t we do so as well? If Rambachan were 
to respond to this question by saying we are 
inherently incapable of “seeing” as the rishis 
did, then he would be setting himself up for a 
massive contradiction, with core tenets of the 
atman being the same in everyone, rishi or not. 
I am unaware of any way out of this 
problem other than my concluding that each 
human also has the same potential as the rishis, 
and that this potential is realized through 
disciplined sadhana (the inner sciences of 
adhyatma vidya), even though very few of us 
are able to realize the ultimate result in one 
human lifetime; most of us will need to be 
reborn many times in order to evolve to the 
rishi state. 
 
Summariz ing my posit ion on  meditat ion  
• Since the Vedas were “seen” by the rishis, 
and we humans have this same capacity, 
each of us has the potential to achieve the 
same experience on his own. In other 
words, we, too, can know Brahman. This 
knowledge is not achieved by means of 
dualistic cognition but by non-dual 
cognition, which Western science is only 
beginning to examine.  
• This study of non-dual cognition is 
“scientific” in that it relies on first-person 
empiricism which may be replicated, and 
because the results of that experience are 
examined and correlated by a community 
of interpreters who are free from history-
centric constraints.  
• This brings us head-on to Rambachan’s 
problem, namely, that Shankara did not 
accept any method of knowing Brahman 
other than the Vedas. But Shankara did 
develop his own meditation system (called 
“Nidhidhyasana”) that uses specific 
Upanishadic mantras as the means to attain 
moksha. Unfortunately Shankara does not 
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explain his method in much detail, though 
his own practice and development of the 
system do indicate he was not dismissive of 
direct experience. (Some scholars have 
argued that his emphasis was on refuting 
the opponents of his time and that this did 
not require that he explain his method of 
meditation.)  
• In my book, I do not recommend any 
specific method of meditation. I merely 
assert that various methods are available to 
every human. My only purpose is to 
contrast the meditative approach with the 
Abrahamic notion of history-centrism and 
in so doing, demonstrate that we can 
achieve what the rishis achieved. The Jew 
or Christian or Muslim cannot participate 
in prophecy (i.e., directly receive and then 
declare the word of God), whereas in 
dharma all humans are capable of self-
enlightenment without having to depend 
on any such historical event. 
• I refer to the methods of achieving higher 
states of consciousness as a “science,” but 
not in the limited sense that the term has 
been used in the past. Science has taken on 
a new meaning; it no longer denotes 
dualistic reductionism, something that 
bothers Rambachan as much as it bothers 
me. 
None of Rambachan’s arguments has any 
bearing on my book’s central point, which is 
that dharmic systems are not history-centric 
whereas Abrahamic religions are. He simply 
dodges the issue of history-centrism and thus 
misunderstands many of my related points.  
 
 
 
Locating Integral  Unity  in  the  New 
Discourse  
Rambachan has devoted his distinguished 
career to the study of Advaita Vedanta and so it 
is natural that he would want this philosophy 
to be the central point of any discussion he 
enters. But my notion of integral unity cannot 
be collapsed into and limited to Advaita 
Vedanta per se, and I certainly do not consider 
ultimate reality to be a homogeneous, 
otherworldly realm, as is sometimes claimed. 
My interest in integrality originated as part of 
my study of the science of consciousness 
mentioned above.  
Again, fundamentally, our greatest 
disagreement has to do with the different ways 
we locate our analyses. I am primarily 
interested in the Western appropriation of 
Eastern ideas, not in defending a “pure” version 
of Hinduism. My project is located in the 
history of ideas, with emphasis on the 
transmission of ideas from India to the West. 
For example, I have tracked Ken Wilber’s 
appropriation of Sri Aurobindo’s theory of 
integral unity, as well as Kashmir Shaivism, 
Tantra and Madhyamika Buddhism. I want to 
discuss Wilber in some depth, not only because 
his work and influence are much greater than 
most scholars of religion realize but because he 
exemplifies much in the contemporary 
Western digestion of Eastern thought.  
Wilber’s early books explicitly translated 
Indian ideas for the benefit of Western 
researchers, especially psychologists and 
philosophers. Initially he attacked Judaism and 
Christianity for the same kinds of problems I 
have cited in my book: dependence on 
historical and exclusive revelation, dualism, 
and so on. In effect, he used Indian ideas to 
attack Western religion and psychology and 
9
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thus became established as a Western pioneer 
in what were considered “new” discoveries. 
But gradually his ambition grew. Not only 
did he appropriate Indian ideas using his own 
terminology; he also claimed to have surpassed 
them. He said he found serious flaws in the 
Indian sources and that these discoveries made 
him reject Hinduism and promote his own 
formulations. His chief criticism addresses only 
Advaita Vedanta, which he uses to dismiss all of 
Hinduism. He cites only secondary 
interpretations of Advaita Vedanta, which he 
uses to claim that it is otherworldly escapism 
and hence incapable of achieving progress or 
promoting social ethics in this world. In this, he 
parrots the old interpretations of Christian 
missionaries. (These are the same views that 
were unfortunately adopted by Ram Mohan 
Roy and other Indians in the modern period as 
a sort of standard critique of Hinduism.) 
Wilbur’s appropriations and redefinitions 
are disingenuous given that most of his sources 
(again, Sri Aurobindo, Kashmir Shaivism, 
Tantra and Madhyamika Buddhism) do not at 
all espouse a homogeneous and otherworldly 
reality, as he is well aware. He cleverly borrows 
from many Indian sources, which we will call 
“X”, and uses this to criticize one specific 
Indian school (Advaita Vedanta). He uses this 
criticism as the basis for rejecting all Hinduism. 
Even if his arguments about Advaita Vedanta 
were valid, his rejection of that school could 
not apply to all of Hinduism. 
Wilber and his followers formulated a 
theory that contains no references to dharma 
sources; instead it refers to what are called 
“Integral Christianity” and “Integral Judaism.” 
Ironically there is no Integral Hinduism in his 
schema, despite my having suggested to his 
acolytes that this ought to have been first and 
foremost given that the theory is based on 
principles that exist in Hinduism. 
Wilber’s reformulated dharmic ideas appeal 
to those Westerners who want to “come home,” 
as it were, from their journeys into Hinduism 
or Buddhism, and this appeal accounts for his 
success in raising funds. In the process, he has 
rekindled Western chauvinism, using so-called 
universal terms in a totalizing, Hegelian 
fashion. 
Despite Wilber’s prominence and influence, 
no scholar of Indian religions has bothered to 
respond to what he is saying. Whenever I raise 
concerns about his misappropriations and 
misinterpretations among scholars of Hinduism 
and Buddhism, they show no interest and even 
dismiss his ideas as irrelevant and nonsensical. 
But he is relevant, and his repackaging of 
dharmic thought has profound implications for 
how Hinduism is received and understood. 
An important objective of Being Different is 
to re-establish the dharmic foundations of what 
has become a large “Integral Studies” 
movement led by Wilber, and this requires that 
we redress the misinterpretation of sources 
(and concomitant reductionism) in his 
formulation. I wish to remind Wilber’s camp of 
his own earlier assertions that Western 
religions are in conflict with the new ideas he 
has “discovered” – assertions that suggest that 
these religions need to be revised or reinvented 
in light of integral theories. What we have, 
then, is a massive importation of Indian ideas 
that are used in the transformation of Judaism 
and Christianity but no acknowledgment of the 
original sources of those ideas. 
My own view of the integral unity of 
dharmic traditions is based on their shared 
methodology in terms of adhyatma vidya. This 
position enables me to defend these traditions 
10
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies, Vol. 26 [2013], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol26/iss1/6
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1545
38 Rajiv Malhotra 
against piecemeal appropriations such as 
Wilbur’s and point out the shortfalls of those 
appropriations. Ironically Rambachan opposes 
my view of the integral unity of dharma, partly, 
I think, because he is unaware of the way in 
which the term “dharma” is already in play 
both among intellectuals and in popular 
discourse as well. Rambachan inadvertently 
provides a great service to Wilber’s movement 
by denying that Hinduism has the metaphysics 
of integral unity. While Wilber appropriates his 
key ideas from Hinduism, Rambachan argues 
that such ideas are not part of Hinduism and 
seems unaware of the broad discourse at work. 
It is a triumph for Wilber to have co-opted such 
a major figure in Hinduism studies. 
 
Reclaiming Integral  Unity  as  a  principle  of  
dharma 
My concept of integral unity is not to be 
conflated with a strict view of Advaita Vedanta 
as the linchpin of that unity. In fact, Appendix 
A of my book explains integral unity with 
respect to several different dharmic traditions. 
Hinduism’s integral unity is mainly illustrated 
by Sri Jiva Goswami’s Achintya-Bhedabheda, 
which is similar to Ramanuja’s Vishishtadvaita. 
The appendix also explains integral unity from 
the perspective of Buddhism and Jainism.  
One disagreement I have with Rambachan 
concerns the status of the relative and absolute 
worlds, or of the distinct “parts” of reality we 
perceive as differentiated, and the putative 
“whole,” which is not. The diagram in Figure 2 
summarizes this idea. The left and right 
extremes show the two common views most 
people have concerning the nature of a “part” 
of the whole reality.2 A part of the totality can 
be a physical object, an idea, an emotion, etc. – 
anything we can perceive as an entity. The 
question then arises: What is the status of such 
an entity in relation to the whole? The stated 
assertion on the left portion of the diagram is 
that the entity exists by itself, i.e., that it has 
self-existence. This seems intuitively obvious to 
the ordinary mind. After all, the tree, the table, 
keyboard, I, and everything I experience seem 
to exist. This view is dualistic. It stems from the 
ordinary ego state of objective cognition 
whereas the dharmic approach has to do with 
transcending that level of experience or 
consciousness.  
The assertion on the right side represents 
the other extreme, which is that the entity does 
not exist at all, i.e., its existence is an illusion. 
As discussed above, this latter view has been 
advanced as a common interpretation of 
Advaita Vedanta, and it is one with which I 
strongly disagree.  
I espouse the view in the middle, which is 
that the entity is mithya, a Sanskrit word with 
no exact equivalent in English. 
 
 
 
Object exists 
independently  
Object is 
mithya 
Object is 
an illusion 
Figure 2 
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Unfortunately mithya has been seriously 
mistranslated as “illusion.” As many 
commentators and acharyas in the tradition 
have stressed, this is incorrect. According to 
this middle view, every entity exists relative to 
something other than itself. Jiva Goswami’s 
interpretation is that an entity exists only as a 
mode or form of Bhagvan and does not exist 
independently as itself. In other words, since 
Bhagvan is real, his forms are also real, but they 
do not have independent self-existence. 
(Analogy: A smile exists as a form or mode of 
the face, and cannot exist independently of the 
face.) I explain In Being Different how mithya as 
relative existence fits in with Buddhism’s idea 
of mutual co-existence, though this is different 
from the relative existence in Hinduism 
because there is nothing equivalent to 
Brahman as an absolute. Integral unity, 
understood this way, is not homogeneous but 
has parts that are mithya. Nor is integral unity 
in one dharmic system the same as in another. 
Rambachan accuses me of the view 
depicted in the diagram’s right extreme, 
namely, that I see reality as one homogeneous 
whole. In doing so, he does an injustice to the 
concept of integral unity as I have articulated 
it, and responds instead with his stock position 
concerning Advaita Vedanta.  
 
Mantra ,  language and non-translatabi l i ty  
A lesser but still important point 
Rambachan raises has to do with my emphasis 
on the non-translatability of Sanskrit, 
especially in relation to mantra. I wish to 
respond by drawing on a perspective from 
Kashmir Shaivism. Kashmir Shaivism holds that 
vac (speech) exists at four levels of subtlety. 
From most subtle to most gross, these are: para, 
pasyanti, madhyam and vaikhari. The first two 
are pre-conceptual and non-linguistic levels of 
vibration, and hence cannot be replaced by 
conventional language at all. But Sanskrit has a 
unique claim in that its beej mantras, or the 
primordial sounds that comprise its building 
blocks, operate at all four levels. At the lower 
two levels, madhyam and vaikhari, the mantras 
manifest as the Sanskrit primordial sounds 
which we speak and hear. But these levels are 
directly linked to the higher ones, para and 
pasyanti. Sanskrit is non-translatable in two 
respects: first, according to the dharmic view, 
this link is not found in any other language. 
There is thus a unique and irreducible non-
translatability here. Second, any language is a 
web of contextual relations that cannot be 
mapped onto a different network of contexts. 
Different contexts carry different meanings. 
Although this problem is not particular to 
Sanskrit, translation problems here are 
especially acute because the original social and 
cultural context is largely lost.  
The non-translatability principle does not 
mean I do not want any Sanskrit word ever to 
be translated or that the work of translators is 
unimportant. It simply means that there should 
be a preference for bringing the important 
terms of Sanskrit into other languages as intact 
as possible (including sharp attention to 
pronunciation and intonation, which are being 
quickly eroded through the popularity of yoga 
and Westernized kirtan today) and that when 
translation is necessary, it should be done with 
the appropriate contexts and alternatives 
indicated. This is especially important when it 
comes to practice. Efforts to find discursive 
equivalents to mantra – as when, in meditation, 
“shantih” is replaced by “peace” -- entirely 
miss the point. 
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II .  Response to Pennington 
Much of Pennington's critique has nothing 
to do with my book, but is about me personally. 
This special issue of the Journal of Hindu-
Christian Studies was designed as a discussion 
and critique of my book, Being Different, but a 
good deal of what Pennington writes amounts 
to personal attacks on me. In fact, Pennington 
states explicitly that he is left wondering what 
my motive/agenda is; he is troubled that the 
academy treats me as a serious scholar worthy 
of a seat at the table. I have decided not to 
respond to him by going "tit for tat" on 
personal matters or with insinuations. 
 
History Centrism Ignored 
Brian Pennington would seem not to 
understand my main points in Being Different, in 
particular my analysis of history-centrism as it 
contrasts with the relative freedom from 
history found in the dharmic traditions. He 
charges that I am mounting “an uncritical 
promotion of a homogenized Indic heritage 
whose superior character… rests on the fact 
that it is protected from the forces of history.” 
Apparently he is unaware of the distinction 
between smirti and shruti, even though my 
book goes to considerable pains to highlight 
this distinction. Smirti is clearly historical; shruti 
is not. Smriti, by definition, is a product of the 
forces of history and is shaped by the 
psychology, social position, and general 
cultural context of humans involved in its 
development and transmission. Throughout his 
argument, Pennington suggests I am somehow 
“against” history and historical readings of past 
texts. This would be tantamount to my being 
against smriti, which is simply untrue.  
Pennington entirely misreads my concept 
of history-centrism, which I have explained 
with some precision. History-centrism is not 
the same as historical consciousness or interest 
in historical truth, both of which are definitely 
present in Indian thought. Rather, it is about a 
certain reification of the historical record of 
God’s interventions through prophets. These 
(alleged) recorded occurrences are then used as 
the basis for theological claims, political 
projects, and religious practices.  
The point of difference, again, concerns 
shruti, not smriti: The direct experience of 
shruti is possible for all humans whereas in the 
Abrahamic religions, prophecy is not available 
to all humans, in part because the time and 
place matter and sometimes even determine 
the content of the revelation. Let me repeat: in 
the dharmic view, shruti is independent of 
history, but smriti is not. The Hindu texts are 
careful to keep these separate and the 
traditions have generally drawn a clear and 
logical boundary between them. In the Judeo-
Christian religions, the two categories are 
collapsed. Both the Hebrew Bible and the New 
Testament have content for which shruti status 
may be claimed as well as other content that 
can only be explained as smriti. (In fact, the 
Bible is full of material that, from a dharmic 
point of view, would be called purana or itihas.) 
The primary task of Christian and Jewish 
exegesis is to draw and redraw the line 
between these two aspects. There are extreme 
positions at both ends. Fundamentalists argue 
that the whole of their Bible is revelation, what 
the dharmic view would label as shruti; liberal 
revisionists and secularists argue that all or 
most of it is historical tradition, i.e., what the 
dharmic would classify as smirti. The whole 
process in the west is, however, clouded and 
sometimes even violent, once again because of 
the problem of history centrism. The particular 
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manifestation of God in specific and 
unrepeatable events in time and through 
specially honored persons or prophets implies 
that the very content of these revelations is 
historical and the historical identity, authority 
and destiny of the messengers affects, and to 
some degree determines, the message (which 
does not have the same weight if uttered by 
anyone other than a prophet). History-
centrism also puts witnesses in conflict with 
one another since there cannot be a plurality of 
views on the actuality of a historical event. 
Hence the two categories of history and eternal 
truth become cloudy at every turn. The 
dharmic traditions do not have this problem, 
not because they are a-historical but because 
they distinguish clearly between the two 
categories. 
None of the three scholars really engages 
with history centrism, which is a central 
concept in my work. In part, this is because 
they do not look at the Judeo-Christian 
tradition through dharmic lenses. Their view of 
Western religions is conditioned (no doubt 
unconsciously) by their Western training and 
assumptions. Westerners often find it troubling 
to deal with their history centrism as seen from 
a dharmic viewpoint. 
 
Creating a Binary:  Hindu 
Fundamentalism or non-existent 
Hinduism  
Pennington further implies that in 
defending the “difference” intrinsic in dharma 
I am in some way colluding with the rise of 
Hindu fundamentalism and with its attempted 
suppression of minorities. Unfortunately, today 
it is virtually impossible to make any positive 
assertions about Hinduism without incurring 
this kind of slur. It is as if arguing for a distinct 
Hindu dharma were the same as arguing for the 
homogenization of India and thus for fascism. 
This prejudiced reading of my work creates a 
smoke screen for failure or refusal to engage 
with my particular assertions about Hinduism. 
So let me say once again that I fully support the 
pluralistic construction of political and social 
structures that will protect and advance the 
rights of all peoples and especially minorities, 
women and the poor.  
There is a silent assumption that the only 
way to avoid Hindu fundamentalism is to adopt 
the position that there is no such thing as a 
unified Hindu dharma. I have already spoken of 
a version of this view which I think Rambachan 
holds, albeit tacitly. Pennington has to confront 
this view more directly as he faces high stakes 
in this debate. He is best known for having 
written the book Was Hinduism Invented?, which 
argues that Hinduism was fabricated under 
British influence and that this fabrication 
accounts for its alleged lack of coherence, unity 
and continuity, i.e., it is a sort of fraud.  
I argue the contrary. Not only is there such 
a thing as Hinduism; it has a long history and 
has a vital role to play in the public sphere. The 
alternative of a repressive secularism -- which 
many scholars, either explicitly or implicitly, 
would seem to support -- is a disaster in the 
making. I wish to see the dharmic principles 
adapted for a contemporary pluralistic society. 
In my book I expressly advocate mutual respect 
for other faiths; hence arguing in favor of the 
integral unity of dharmic traditions does not, in 
any way, subordinate other traditions. By the 
same token, this mutual respect does not mean 
that the voice of Hinduism should be silenced -- 
an outcome to which Pennington’s position 
would surely lead.  
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Pennington argues, in a related vein, that it 
is my intention “to studiously avoid any 
suggestion that dharmic traditions are 
multiple, distinct in their various expressions, 
or products of disparate influences.” He quotes 
me — quite accurately -- as saying that “if 
dharma is put forward merely as an eclectic 
collection of disparate ideas, it will lack the 
cohesiveness necessary to function as a force 
for change.” But these two statements, his and 
mine, do not correspond in any way. Of course, 
dharmic traditions are multiple and distinct; 
that is precisely the thing about them that I 
wish to uphold. And of course they are the 
product of various influences: historical, social, 
intellectual, cultural and experiential. I have 
often said as much. I do not, however, hold that 
they lack internal coherence. 
 
Differences in ‘Chaos’  Narratives  
Pennington goes on to question my 
“categorical” assessment that Westerners are 
especially uneasy about the notion of variation 
and nuance in the domain of ethics, that they 
see India and Indians as lacking in ethical 
principles, and that for similar reasons they are 
baffled and disturbed by Indian aesthetics. But 
my position here is based squarely on a great 
deal of evidence in a large number of 
sociological and psychological studies, evidence 
which I present and annotate copiously in Being 
Different.  
My book adds two analytic points to that 
body of evidence: (1) the Western response 
originates in a fear of chaos, and (2) this fear 
has deep roots in both Biblical and Hellenistic 
cosmology. It is in this context that I offer a 
comparative reading of narratives found in 
Genesis, Homer and Indian sources. I do indeed, 
as Pennington claims, treat these narratives as 
“unity templates for moral action and the 
apprehension of reality,” but I do so because 
this is precisely how they have functioned in 
the religious lives of many people. To study and 
critique narratives in these terms is a well-
established practice in the humanities, and to 
suggest that my doing so is somehow 
tantamount to a denial of historical context 
and conditioning is a serious misreading.  
 
Pennington’s  high stakes 
Pennington has long argued against 
“Hinduism” as a legitimate term, and naturally 
he wishes to safeguard and defend his previous 
work. Hence, he attacks my treatment of 
Hinduism as coherent and also a positive 
resource. Yet he has not been able to pinpoint 
any central or fundamental flaws in my 
treatment, at least not in any compelling way.  
Perhaps it is for this reason that he turns 
from the book he was supposed to review and 
takes aim instead at my prior, unrelated work 
of many years ago. In fact he states explicitly 
that he accepted this invitation to write in 
order to address his old gripes with what he 
sees as my “career as a Hindu activist.” He 
writes: 
Why do Princeton and the University of 
Massachusetts offer him a podium? Why does 
the International Journal of Hindu Studies 
organize a symposium on his work? Why does 
the Society for Hindu-Christian Studies honor 
him with serious discussion of his book at one of 
the only two sessions it holds annually and with 
a symposium in the one issue of its annual 
journal? 
Unable to refute, or even engage with, my 
book’s arguments, he thus resorts to dismissing 
my right to be at the table in current debates.  
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Aastika :  Coherence  and change  
Why does Pennington wish to exclude me 
from the table? To answer this, we must 
address the difficult question of what 
constitutes religious studies – and indeed 
religion itself – in today’s world. Is religion 
defined by one fixed and frozen canon to be 
interpreted only by academic scholars and 
“legitimate” exegetists? Or is it a living, organic 
entity that evolves, with new discoveries and 
contexts that encourage “churning” among its 
practitioners, often resulting in new forms of 
consensus that challenge and replace old ones? 
I claim it is the latter. Hinduism is arguably the 
most dynamic of the major religions, with a 
long history of diverse schools and a seemingly 
inexhaustible supply of new gurus who debate 
amongst themselves without a central nexus of 
authority to adjudicate over them. Put another 
way, these gurus are like intellectual 
entrepreneurs who compete with each other by 
advancing new ideas, revising old ones, etc. I 
have argued that Hinduism’s freedom from 
absolutist history centrism accounts for this 
dynamism, which I think should be encouraged 
at the academic level as well. 
The term “aastika” is useful in gaining an 
understanding of this churning practice in 
Hinduism’s long history and in appreciating the 
unity in dharma. “Aasitka” encapsulates how 
Hindus have vigorously debated the criteria for 
what constitutes their faith. The very existence 
of such a term at the center of Hindu discourse 
shows that the quest for coherence is very old. 
At the same time, the definition of aastika has 
long been vigorously contested and debated. In 
stark contrast to the Nicene Creed of 
Christianity3, there is no static, history-centric 
statement or institutionalized criterion for 
aastika. The phenomenon of multiple Hindu 
gurus formulating innovative interpretations 
that challenge established ones can be traced 
back to classical times. Vivekananda, Gandhi, 
Sri Aurobindo, Ramana Maharshi – these are 
but a few of the modern gurus who have 
reformulated Hindu dharma for their own 
contexts. But again, the trend is much older. 
There is nothing new or “manufactured” about 
this dynamism, in spite of what Pennington 
would have us believe. 
So coherence and unity exist but in a 
dynamic equilibrium that is conducive to 
rigorous, constructive debate. This aspect of 
Hinduism poses a serious problem for Western 
academics, whose methods were developed for 
the less fluid and more reified “religions of the 
book.” It is time for the academy to re-imagine 
Hindu dharma on new terms, and this requires 
engaging those thinkers whose voices the 
Hindu communities recognize as their own. 
 
Pennington’s  problem in locating me in 
his  stereotypes 
With respect to my work in particular, it 
troubles Pennington that he cannot locate me 
in his limited, narrow framework of where 
Hindus belong. There are two main ways in 
which Hindus have participated in the Western 
academy. 
One way is as an outsider, or “native 
informant,” who has less power in relation to 
the scholar and who seldom talks back or 
shares in the prestige and recognition of 
authorship. He certainly does not get a chance 
to articulate what he sees when he “reverses 
the gaze,” i.e., ceases to be the object and fixes 
his own gaze on the Westerner. It is mostly 
poor villagers who have been “studied” as 
native informants, though many gurus have 
been as well, and often with their full co-
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operation. These gurus are largely ignorant of 
the “playing field” and in many cases are 
dependent on Western patronage. 
The second way a Hindu participates in 
Western studies is as a scholar inside the 
academy, where he is under great pressure to 
adopt the syndicated and authorized 
hermeneutics of his mentors and peers, and 
often compromises his own tradition’s 
siddhanta (theory and method) in doing so. 
Many such individuals have told me they, in 
effect, lead double lives: privately they can 
agree with me and even help me in my own 
pursuit of reform, but in front of peers, they 
must protect their careers by closing ranks. 
Some Hindu scholars have gone even further 
and marketed themselves as “sepoys,” to be 
used as “hit men” against uncontrollable 
Hindus like me who refuse to submit. 
Pennington’s problem is that I fit into 
neither category. I am not a benign, passive 
native informant available to help scholars by 
supplying them with the data that they want to 
hear. Nor do I tailor my scholarship to fit 
current academic norms in the study of 
Hinduism. 
Pennington also takes umbrage at my 
pointed attacks on the self-validating and 
closed circle of peer review in the academy and 
on the prevalence of heavy funding for the 
study of hypotheses that “just happen” to 
support or benefit projects of Western 
hegemony, both intellectual and political. I 
would simply like to point out that while 
corruptions of the peer review system in the 
academy become scandals in the sciences, they 
go largely unnoticed in the humanities, and 
had I taken a more deferential and subaltern 
tone in drawing attention to them, my 
argument would have gained no hearing 
whatsoever. 
In the case of Being Different, however, 
Pennington is simply wrong in stating that I 
wrote it as a way of “speaking back to the 
academy.” He also alleges that I wrote the book 
as a way of engaging directly with the scholarly 
world. Indeed, a decade back I did focus on 
changing the Western system through its own 
guardians, but for many years now, most of my 
target audience has been from the Hindu 
dharma community in the broad sense. In the 
process, I have actively engaged the leading 
gurus, civic and industry leaders, as well as 
scholars, both in India and North America. As 
the record shows, my book has reading lists in 
Indian university departments of psychology, 
management, social sciences, technology, etc. 
Also, my critique of the inauthentic 
appropriation of Indian ideas and practices has 
placed certain Western schools of thought 
under scrutiny. This broad reception is based 
on the realization that what I am proposing is 
“a new gaze,” both internally, at Hinduism 
itself, and externally, at the West -- a gaze 
moreover which empowers Hindus to see 
themselves as global citizens with dharma-
based identities. Thanks to the power of the 
internet and social media in general, my book is 
having a global impact. It is also now reaching 
American classrooms, where people like 
Pennington teach. 
As a result not just of my work in this area 
but also of a much broader movement of ideas, 
the Western academy no longer enjoys a 
monopoly on shaping the public’s 
understanding of “the East.” Americans today 
receive their ideas about Indian traditions 
through travel, the workplace, Indian friends, 
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novels, art, popular culture, the Internet, and 
other emerging channels. 
This increasingly well-informed readership 
regards many of the old-school portrayals of 
Hinduism as bizarre, inaccurate and unreliable. 
My own work provides a much-needed analytic 
platform for their concerns, as even those 
within the academy are starting to realize. 
When I do address the academy (and I do so 
only by invitation), I try to hold its leading 
scholars accountable for the misinformation 
and confusion they spread, and to expose how 
these errors arise from self-perpetuating 
structures and entrenched positions. If this in 
itself makes me appear as a threat, I feel 
satisfied that my work is making a difference. I 
am glad there are a growing number of serious 
and open-minded academicians who wish to 
engage with the substance of my arguments 
while taking the wider context into account. 
 
I I I .  Response to Edelman 
Like Rambachan and Pennington, Jonathan 
Edelman expresses concern about my 
treatment of science and history-centrism, and 
takes me to task for not understanding the 
diversity of both Hinduism and Christianity. He 
asserts that I oversimplify the tension between 
religion and science in the West, and cites the 
(very infrequent) acceptance of scientific views 
by Christians and the new blurring of the 
boundaries between science and religion as 
exemplified by the John Templeton 
Foundation.  
First, it is a matter of historical record that 
Christianity and science in the West have long 
been violently opposed. Galileo was censured 
by the church and Darwin’s theories were 
strongly resisted in most mainstream Christian 
circles. This resistance lives on in political and 
legal disputes over the teaching of evolution in 
American schools today. Second, I am well 
aware of the blurring of the line between 
science and religion today, though I do not 
think it takes quite the simplistic form Edelman 
suggests. I have explained my views on this in 
detail in my response, above, to Rambachan. A 
third point: the Templeton Foundation’s 
program on science and religion was largely 
built by scholars who borrowed Hindu and 
Buddhist ideas; most of its initial thinkers 
drank heavily from those wells. Figure 1 lists 
Templeton as one of the major organizations 
built on digesting dharmic knowledge and 
transforming it into new frameworks that 
appear to be original.  
With respect to the question of history-
centrism, Edelman notes that certain Hindu 
traditions give central theological authority to 
a particular purana and make its author central 
as well. But here again, he misses the point. It is 
not that Indian thought does not take note of 
the particular circumstances of certain texts or 
value their association with certain authors. Of 
course these texts and authors arrive in time; 
how else could they occur? Of course the 
teachings about Brahman have a history and a 
context and even, at points, an internal 
unfolding order. But these teachings do not 
depend on specific historical events and 
validations equivalent to the exodus of the 
Israelites from Egypt under Moses or the 
resurrection of Jesus. In Judaism and in 
Christianity, respectively, they do. The 
distinctions between shruti and smriti help to 
illuminate this point. 
The important question here is: Would the 
theology of bhakti be significantly different if it 
were “proved” that the Bhagavata Purana came 
to someone other than Vyasa, or at some other 
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time or place? The answer is: not at all. But if it 
were proved that the Ten Commandments were 
delivered outside of the Jewish tradition and 
Jewish history, or if they were, say, delivered 
out of sequence with regard to other key 
revelations in Judaism, then that religion would 
be profoundly affected. Jews could no longer 
see themselves as unique bearers of truth in 
history with unique privileges and 
responsibilities. Likewise, if the revelation that 
God is the savior came to someone other than 
Jesus, Christians could no longer believe either 
in the incarnation or the trinity, the two 
essential doctrinal pillars of their faith. For 
Vaishavites, however, the bhakti 
reinterpretation of the whole of the Vedic past 
is true, and would be true even if someone else 
in some other time and place had discovered it. 
Its validity does not depend on historical 
events contemporary with the discovery or on 
the particular ethnic and historical identity of 
Vyasa himself. Vaishnavites do not claim that 
this history created a new, unique covenant or 
new ritam that was previously unavailable and 
that is available today only through the 
knowledge of that covenant and no other way. 
The importance of history to salvation in 
the West is well-recognized and if that were all 
I were saying, I would indeed be uttering a 
commonplace, as Edelman claims. But that is 
not all. I am speaking of a primacy given to 
historical events themselves that goes beyond 
the role of history in other major religious or 
philosophical traditions and that seriously 
blocks any genuine pluralism. For Hindus and 
Buddhists this point is often difficult to grasp. 
The complex relationship between the line of 
prophets in the Abrahamic religions -- that is, 
between Abraham, Moses, Jesus and 
Mohammed, to name only the key ones -- does 
not at all operate like a parampara or line of 
transmission in dharma, even though Edelman 
claims it does. Among other things, these 
prophets are in competition with one another 
for complete and exclusive control over their 
respective traditions, and that control depends, 
as I have said, on their place in an unfolding 
linear temporality and on the events and 
outcomes of history itself.  
Edelman also criticizes what he takes to be 
my lack of awareness of the diversity within 
Christianity. In my view (that is, the dharmic 
view), this notion of Christian diversity is 
myopic at best. Clearly people like Edelman feel 
the need to rescue the West from its history of 
violent suppression of diverse religious views, 
and so they repeatedly hold up the example of 
a few dissenters. (These are mostly American 
Protestants of the past two centuries who no 
longer represent the Christian mainstream, if 
in fact they ever did.) Edelman cites, for 
instance, Christians who do not find it 
necessary to believe in the historical Jesus and 
his resurrection or in the basic historical 
accuracy of the gospels’ accounts of this event. 
That such persons exist I do not doubt; indeed I 
have enjoyed meting a few. But strictly 
speaking they are not mainstream Christians 
and cannot, in good conscience, sign on to any 
of the basic creeds and affirmations by which 
Christianity, in any recognized denomination, 
is defined. An affirmation of precisely this set 
of beliefs is, as I point out in Being Different, built 
into the creed that is the gold standard of 
Christian orthodoxy and that is said every 
Sunday in every church with a legitimate claim 
to Christian identity. Belief in the historical 
accuracy of the accounts of Jesus’ rising from 
the dead in the gospels was re-emphasized as a 
key article of faith even at Vatican II, the 
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Church council that supposedly liberalized so 
many other Roman Catholic doctrines. 
On the matter of Hindu education, the 
importance of the study of Sanskrit, and the 
full recognition and support of both Western 
and Indian scholars who attempt to save and 
preserve the textual tradition, I am entirely in 
agreement with Edelman, as the record of 
projects I have funded through the Infinity 
Foundation clearly shows.  
 
 
 
Notes 
1 See Being Different, pp. 124-126. 
2 A similar point can be made using particulars 
and universals instead of parts and wholes. 
3 The criteria for being aastika have varied over 
time. These include: one who “affirms the value 
of ritual” (Medhatithi); one who “affirms the 
existence of virtue and vice” (Hariibhadra); one 
who “affirms the existence of another world 
after death” (the grammarians); and one who 
“affirms the Vedas as the source of ultimate 
truth” (Vijnanabhiksu Madhava, etc.). 
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